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Chapter Seven 
Providing Humanitarian Assistance 
Behind Rebel Lines: UNICEF's 
Eastern ZaYre Operation 1996-1998 
Lauchlan T. Munro1 
This chapter is a case study of one UN agency's efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to local and refugee populations living in territory under the de facto control of a rebel group, while continuing to work in government-held territory 
as well. The chapter also outlines what took place after the rebel alliance became the de 
jure government and then fell apart to such an extent that a rebel state-within-a-state 
was in effect reestablished in the heartland ofthe previous rebellion even before armed 
conflict broke out again. The case study is the United Nations Children's Fund's (UNICEF) 
Eastern Za'ire Operation from i 996 to 1998. The purpose of this chapter is to give read-
ers an idea of how a multilateral agency responds to a situation where it must work with 
a state-within-a-state, and to illustrate some of the legal, ethical, and practical issues that 
may arise in such situations and how they may be dealt with. Implications for theory 
and policy are derived. 
This chapter does not claim to be a purely objective piece of social science research. 
It is rather a set of reflections from someone who was there, and deeply involved in 
many of the events and processes described here. Though this chapter is not a memoir, 
it has many of the strengths and weaknesses of that genre. Nor does the chapter pretend 
to be comprehensive either in the sense of telling the whole story of the UN's work in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ex-Zaire, DR Congo) 2 in recent years, or in · 
the sense of covering all the issues facing multilateral agencies in dealing with states-
within-states. To write a comprehensive essay in the first sense would be an immense 
task, and inappropriate for this forum. And no case study can be comprehensive in the 
second sense; that is simply the nature of a case study. What I hope readers will get from 
this chapter, though, is a sense of what it was·like to be there, how issues arose, how they 
got worked through, what the consequences were, and what lessons there are for the 
United Nations and others in dealing with other states-within-states. 
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Historical Background 
The conflicts that have beset the eastern provinces of the DR Congo in the past decade· 
have deep historical roots. The social formations that lie at the origins of much of the 
current conflict date back at least 300 years.3 These conflicts are also closely linked with 
recent conflicts in neighboring states, especially Rwanda, but also Uganda and Burundi, 
with the ways colonialism interacted with precolonial social formations, and with the 
failed politics of the postindependence era.4 
The immediate trigger to the conflicts that have affiicted the eastern provinces of the 
DR Congo since 1994 is usually taken to be the Rwandan genocide of April-June 1994. 
In fact, however, the fires of ethnic hatred and ethnic cleansing were burning in 
North and South Kivu provinces of Zaire for over a year before that, as members of other 
ethnic groups attempted to clear the Tutsi ethnic group out of the Masisi and Mulenge 
mountains.5 This ethnic cleansing was encouraged by the Za'irois government of 
President Mobutu Sese Seko, which had just reversed an earlier decision granting Zalrois 
citizenship to the Tutsis, and had since 1990 been alarmed by the Tursi-led rebellion 
against the then friendly government of neighboring Rwanda. After the genocide of the 
Rwandan Tursis, around a million Rwandan Hutus poured over the border into Za'ire 
and were serried in refugee camps near the border. Included in their number were some 
members of the !nterahamwe militia and the ex-Forces Armies Rwandaises (ex-FAR) who 
had been responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. The Mobutu government, which was 
probably complicit in the genocide itself and certainly complicit in protecting the perpe-
trators afterward, showed no desire to disarm the Interahamwe and ex-FAR and separate 
them out from the genuine refugees. In the absence of any such desire by Mobutu's 
government, the international community made no serious effort to force the separation 
of the militias from the refugees. The genocidaires of the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR, for 
their part, were happy to use the civilian members of the refugee population as human 
shields and as bait to attract food and other aid from the international community. 
The presence of these large refugee camps in North and South Kivu provinces had a 
profound impact on the host communities. Initially, there was a wave of epidemic dis-
eases affecting both the refugees and the local populations, when the sudden arrival of 
around a million poor and unhealthy people overwhelmed the already fragile public 
health infrastructure of the Kivus. In addition, land had to be set aside for the refugees, 
which displaced some locals. The refugees needed to eat and to cook, and so the local 
biomass was rapidly degraded as refugees felled trees and rook food from nearby natural 
and domestic sources, including the farms oflocal Za!rois. The !nterahamwe and the ex-
FAR soon set themselves up as the de facto government of the refugees camps and as an 
organized crime syndicate who committed crimes against their fellow countrymen in 
the refugee camps, local Zairois, and occasionally, the aid workers sent to assist the 
refugees. The !nterahamwe and the ex-FAR also participated in attacks against Za'irois 
Tutsi and in cross-border raids against the new government that was installed in Rwanda 
in June 1994. All this was condoned by the Za'irois authorities, who were already 
unpopular due to decades of misrule on a colossal scale. The amount of aid flowing into 
the refugee camps, estimated at around US$1 million per day in 1994-1996, caused 
further resentment amongst the locals; the economic, nutritional, and epidemiological 
situation of the Za'irois populations living next to the refugee camps was broadly 
similar to the situation of those in the camps, bur the locals got far less assistance than 
the refugees. 
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UNICEF's Ettstern Zaire Operation 121 
The spark that lit the powder keg was an attempted ethnic cleansing of the Tutsis 
living in and around the town of Uvira in South Kivu in August-September 1996. The 
Tutsis struck back and quickly formed alliances with other groups who were disaffected 
with Mobutu's regime and/or hostile to the refugees. The Rwandan and Ugandan 
governments saw an opportunity to settle old scores against Mobutu's government and 
quickly provided military and political assistance. A political party was soon cobbled 
together under the name of the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du 
Congo (AFDL). The AFDL united behind a platform called the Lemera Declaration, 
named after the town in South Kivu where the AFDCs founding conference was held. 
The Lemera Declaration called for the overthrow of Mobutu's corrupt regime and the 
removal of the Rwandan and Burundian refugees from Congolese soil.6 Though mem-
bers of the Tutsi ethnic group quickly took on leadership positions in the AFDL, die 
new opposition movement needed a leader from a different ethnic group to give it 
broader legitimacy, both inside and outside the Kivus. It is widely believed that, around 
October 1996, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni introduced the Rwandan Vice 
President and Minister of Defence Paul Kagame, the eminence grise behind the AFDL, 
to a Congolese radical and failed revolutionary whom Museveni had known in exile 
in Tanzania years before; that man was Laurent Kabila, and he was installed as the 
president of the AFDL.7 
Events moved quickly between late September and early November 1996. The 
AFDL troops, aided by the Rwandan army and returning Congolese exiles from 
throughout east Africa, quickly captured most of South Kivu. Rebellion soon erupted in 
North Kivu in sympathy with the South Kivu rebels, and the two branches of the AFDL 
joined up by early November. Mobutu's troops, ill-disciplined, unpaid for months, and 
demoralized, put up only token resistance, preferring instead to pillage local communi-
ties, then flee, or desert. 
The AFDL made no secret of its hostility toward the Hutu refugees from Burundi 
and-especially-Rwanda living in Zaire, and attacked the refugee camps. The camps, 
each of which contained tens or hundreds of thousands of refugees, quickly disbanded, 
usually in a matter of hours. Most of the refugees returned to Rwanda and Burundi, but 
around a fifth or a quarter-no one knows for sure-fled west into the dense rain forests 
of the central Congo basin, a thinly populated and virtually infrastructure-free zone. 
Lost under the dense canopy of trees, over a 100,000 refugees disappeared from the 
world's radar screens; many never came back. It was not long before reports began to 
emerge concerning massacres of refugees in the forests by AFDL and Rwandan troops. 
The AFDL denied these reports, or dismissed them as isolated incidents, and certainly 
not the policy of the AFDL. The Rwandan government, for its part, at the time denied 
that it had any troops in Za'ire.8 I have seen and interviewed enough refugees, and spo-
ken to enough aid workers who were on the spot, to convince myself that the massacres 
of refugees were deliberate policy. The UN Joint Mission charged with investigating 
allegations of massacres and other human rights violations in Za'ire came to a similar 
conclusion. 9 
The situation in eastern Za'ire in late 1996 and the first half of 1997 can only be 
described as dire. The local population had been deeply impoverished by over three 
decades of socioeconomic decay and gross misrule, 10 compounded by the refugee crisis 
and associated armed conflict. Public infrastructure was degraded to the point where, in 
the 1990s, Zaire was the only country in the world with fewer kilometres of road than it 
had had a quarter century earlier. 11 Many schools and health centers, already poorly 
':,? 
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staffed and equipped before the crisis, had been looted and/or occupied by one military 
group or another; health and education staff were often dead or internally displaced. 
Commercial activity had been severely disrupted, especially outside the major towns. 
Tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people were out in the jungle, out 
of reach of any kind of assistance. Tens of thousands of internally displaced people were 
scattered in different parrs of the country, on both sides of the front line between the 
AFDL-Rwandan army and Mobutu's Forces Armees Zai'roises (FAZ). There was a crying 
need for international humanitarian relief for both refugee and local populations. 
By the end of November 1996, the AFDL was the de facto authority governing 
a territory covering most of North and South Kivu, an area roughly the size of Uganda 
and containing perhaps six million people or more. President Mobutu was forced to ask 
for negotiations and a truce. By the time the United Nations, which had evacuated its 
international staff from the Kivus in late October and early November, returned to the 
Kivus almost a month later, they found they had to deal with the AFDL as the de facto 
government of that territory. 
The AFDL and the UN Agencies, November 1996-May 1997 
Having liberated large pans of the Kivus from the corrupt rule of Mobutu's govern-
ment, the AFDL declared itself to be the responsible authority (autorite respomable) for 
the governance of the territory behind its front line. 12 As such, it assumed responsibility 
for law and order and for relations between eastern Za'ire and foreign states and interna-
tional organizations. The AFDL also claimed the power to regulate all economic, social, 
political, and developmental activity, including the affairs of the UN agencies and both 
local and international NGOs. 
The main UN emergency agencies, namely the UNHCR, the World Food 
Programme (WFP), and the UNICEF, 13 quickly returned to the AFDL-controlled ter-
ritory in November 1996. The UNHCR had to return, since its core business, the pro-
tection of refugees under the 1951 Convention on Refagees, 14 continued to be a burning 
issue. The WFP returned because food insecurity was a major concern for refugee and 
local populations alike, and its mandate required it to act to help restore food security. 
UNICEF, for its part, had in the 1980s and 1990s pioneered three seperate humanitarian 
concepts: humanitarian corridors, days of tranquility for children, and children them-
selves as zones of peace. UNICEF had for over a decade provided protection and basic 
services to children on both sides of the front line in several civil wars. Like the 
UNHCR, UNICEF's obligation to work behind rebel lines was grounded in interna-
tional law. UNICEF's interpretation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child was 
that children on both sides of a civil war had the right to the benefits of "international 
co-operation," 15 including UNICEF's assistance. The presence of the UN agencies in 
AFDL territory was therefore based on more than a simple humanitarian urge; it was 
grounded in the agencies' internationally agreed mandates and in international human-
itarian and human rights law. 
In pursuing their mandates in eastern Zaire in 1996-1997, the United Nations had 
to work with the de facto authority controlling that area, the AFDL, on a wide variety 
of issues. The UN agencies were willing to work with the new de facto authorities. This 
willingness to cooperate was facilitated in many instances by the fact that the UN's 
counterparts before the AFDL takeover had hardly changed at all after the AFDL 
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UNICEF's Eastern Zai're Operation 123 
Agriculture, Public Health, National Education, and Social Affairs, and parastatals such 
as Water Supply and Roads. Only the political and security staff in areas like the 
Governors' offices and the Agence Nationale des Renseignements, 16 the secret police, had 
changed after the AFDL takeover, and some new political structures had been created, 
such as the AFDL Secretariat and the Comitis Techniques charged with AFDL-UN liaison 
in North Kivu and Province Orientale (formerly Haut Zai're). But the United Nations 
also had to deal with this political side of the AFDL regime in the months before the 
AFDL rook Kinshasa, especially on the refugee question, but also on other issues. In the 
early months, AFDL-UN relations were severely complicated by political issues, even 
very old ones. Some of the AFDI.:s leaders, nor least Kabila himself, still had bitter 
memories of the "betrayal" of the Congo by the United Nations in the early 1960s, and 
spoke quite openly of their contempt for the United Nations. 
More immediately, the main UN agencies in the Kivus had all been deeply involved 
in the Rwandan and Burundian refugee camps and were therefore viewed as suspect 
by the AFDI.:s senior leadership. We were constantly asked why we had supported the 
genocidaires and ignored the legitimate needs of the Congolese people. Of the three big 
UN agencies in the Kivus, the UNHCR and the WFP had come explicitly to deal with 
the refugee influx. The smallest of the three, UNICEF, had had an office in Bukavu, 
capital of South Kivu, since the 1970s and had established an office in Goma, the capi-
tal of North Kivu, a year before the refugee influx. Still, the UN's work in the Kivus in 
1994-1996 had overwhelmingly to do with refugees, and even UNICEF was viewed by 
many in the Kivus as a part of the UNHCR or as a junior contractor doing some of 
UNHCR's business. When I was appointed in March 1997 to head UNICEF's new 
Eastern Zaire Operation, one of my first challenges was to prove to the AFDL authori-
ties that UNICEF was there to work with and for Congolese children, while still playing 
a credible role fulfilling the agency's duty toward children caught up in the refugee 
crisis, which was grabbing the attention of the world's media. It was nor an easy task, 
nor one at which I succeeded particularly well. AFDL-UN relations were further 
complicated by an investigation by the UNHCR into the allegations of massacres of 
refugees by AFDL and Rwandan forces. This investigation was deeply resented by the 
AFDL-and Rwanda-who wanted to know why the investigation of these alleged 
massacres was so much more important than the horror of the Rwandan genocide, 
which had not been so investigated. The UN investigation of the massacres colored the 
AFDI..:s views of all UN agencies, even those that had been working and continued to 
work with and for the Congolese population. 
The UN's programs and projects in eastern Zai're showed both continuity and 
change in the wake of the AFDI..:s takeover. The activities of the UNHCR, the biggest 
UN agency, changed dramatically from a focus on camp management to emergency 
assistance to Rwandan and Burundian refugees who were on the run in the jungle. The 
WFP's work also changed significantly to address the plight of the now mobile refugees, 
though the WFP retained some of its earlier activities supporting the food security 
of local populations. UNICEF supported UNHCR and WFP in the refugee rescue 
operation, but still put most ofirs resources into assisting local populations with immu-
nization, essential drugs, water and sanitation, and child protection services. The large 
international NGOs present in eastern Za"ire at the time (e.g. Action internationale 
contre Ia faim, CARE, Medecins sans frontrieres, OXFAM, Save the Children) 
adjusted their program activities in a manner similar to the WFP and UNICEF, that is 
with a dual focus on both the refugee emergency and assistance to local populations. 
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The International Committee of the Red Cross did tremendous work in favor of the 
internally displaced Zairois. Unfortunately for the humanitarian relief organizations, 
the international media's intense interest in the humanitarian aspects of the Zaire crisis 
in 1996-1997 centered almost entirely on the assistance to the Rwandan refugees, while 
the work with and in favor of local Zalrois went unreported. This media slant, though 
understandable given the dramatic nature of the refugee crisis, had unfortunate ramifi-
cations for humanitarian operations in eastern Zaire/DR Congo in later months, as it 
reinforced the AFDL's impression that the United Nations and the international NGOs 
cared more about Rwandan refugees than about Congolese citizens. 
The AFDL was an ideologically disparate alliance, bringing together groups 
whose only common goal was the removal of Mobutu. Two of the dominant-and 
interconnected-ideological tendencies in the AFDL in 1997 were, however, an unre-
constructed 1960s Afro-Marxism and a strong Congolese nationalism. 17 Both reacted 
strongly against Mobutu's chaotic rule and his reliance on Western powers for money 
and military support, as well as against the proliferation ofNGOs in Zai"re. 18 Both these 
tendencies within the AFDL viewed the United Nations wirh great suspicion and 
• sought detailed state regulation of economic and developmemal acriviry, including UN 
operations. In their desire to regulate the UN agencies' operarions in AFDL territory, 
the AFDL authorities often asked, or even ordered, rhe UN agencies in their territory 
to do things that fell outside of, or even violated, their mandares. The Unired Nations 
naturally refused. UNICEF was asked, for example, to provide rems and warer facilities 
for a military cantonment, and to finance construction of a road in a militarily sensitive 
area. The UN agencies' refusals to comply with such requests were in turn interpreted as 
a lack of willingness to cooperate with the AFDL. 
AFDL officials also routinely referred to UN agencies as "NGOs" and rried at times 
to register and regulate them as NGOs. This effort was stiffly resisted by the UN agen-
cies, who were understandably protective of their status as international organizations. 
All the UN agencies had signed basic cooperation agreements wirh the government of 
Zaire or its predecessors and, in both Za"irois and international law, these were the rele-
vant legal instruments, along with the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, 19 which Zaire and Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi had ratified. The 
AFDL authorities either simply did not understand these facts due to inexperience and 
lack of training,20 or chose to ignore them because it suited their purposes ro do so. At 
times, AFDL officials denied that such agreements existed or thar rhey were binding on 
a "revolutionary government." Some AFDL officials in the eastern provinces continued 
to make such denials and evasions even after the AFDL became the internationally 
recognized government in Kinshasa. 
In practical terms, the AFDL forbade direct comacts between UN offices in its 
territory-or "zone" as the United Nations called it-and UN offices in rhe rest of the 
country. The reason given was that the AFDL was afraid that spies could send military 
intelligence information to the AFDL's enemies in Kinshasa. UN offices were rherefore 
strict in observing radio silence between the two zones, since high frequency radio sig-
nals are easily monitored by third parties.21 Cellular telephone conracr between 
Kinshasa and the east was cut off by the AFDL through the simple expedient of discon-
necting the cell phone hubs in the four cities that had them, namely Bukavu, Goma, 
Kisangani, and Lubumbashi.22 UN offices did have satellite telephones that could con-
nect the two zones, but access was strictly controlled and interzonal calls were made only 



























































































UN!CEF's Eastern Zaire Operation 125 
only in unusual circumstances, since they created a paper trail and the news of a fax 
arriving from the other side of the front line could start rumors spreading, even if the 
contents of the fax were totally innocuou?. The main form of contact between the two 
zones was e-mail sent by satellite phone through each agency's headquarters server. Access to 
e-mail and the small number of computers on which e-mail software was installed had to 
be strictly controlled, and was usually limited to the head of office, his deputy and the IT 
or security officer. E-mail traffic was not printed out, but was saved electronically. 
Adherence to these strict rules on how (not) to communicate with the other side of 
the same country paid off for the United Nations in terms of minimizing the number 
of incidents that might have arisen if communications protocols had been more sloppy, 
but they did make life more difficult for UN staff. Many issues still had to be discussed 
between the UN's Kinshasa offices and UN offices in the rebel east, not least the fate of 
UN local staff displaced onto the other side of the from line, and important questions of 
management structures and budgets (see later). One way of addressing these questions 
without arousing suspicions was for senior UN management from both sides of the 
front line to meet face-to-face. Since both Mobutu's government and the AFDL refused 
to admit into their respective territories people having visas or stamps_ in their passports 
from the other zone, such meetings had to take place in third countries. I attended such 
meetings in Nairobi and Brazzaville. 
Even so, the AFDL showed great interest in the UN's communications hardware, 
software, and procedures and tried on a number of occasions to interfere with them, 
regulate them, and monitor them. The fact that such interference, regulation and mon-
itoring are illegal made the UN agencies resist such intrusions vigorously.23 This resist-
ance was interpreted on the AFDL side as a lack of willingness to cooperate at best, and 
as proof that the United Nations was on the side of the AFDL's enemies at worst. After 
reports began to appear concerning the massacres of refugees in the forests, those agen-
cies and the NGOs most involved in assisting refugees in Zaire had all the more reason 
to protect their information and communications. 
Finally, the UN agencies had to engage in a delicate balancing act from the time they 
resumed operations in AFDL-held territory in November 1996 umil the fall ofKinshas4 
to the AFDL in May 1997. Mobutu's government in Kinshasa was still the internation-
ally recognized government of the whole of Za"ire, and indeed Zaire was still the inter-
nationally recognized name of the country, the AFDL's assertions notwithstanding. All 
the UN agencies continued to maintain offices in Kinshasa and in other cities still under 
the control of Mobutu's forces, and UN-supported projects and programs continued to 
operate in territory controlled by the Government of Za"ire. The Kinshasa government 
jealously guarded its role as the internationally recognized government even as the last 
shreds of its de facto authority were disappearing before the advancing AFDL troops. 
The Mobutu government constantly reminded the UN agencies to behave "correctly" 
toward it; since UN offices in·Kinshasa had already been looted twice by the FAZ in the 
1990s, these reminders were interpreted as thinly veiled threats. By March 1997 the sit-
uation became even more complicated as it became increasingly clear that the Mobutu 
government's days were numbered and that, sooner or later, the AFDL would capture 
Kinshasa and become the officially recognized government. Not only did the United 
Nations have to deal with a de jure state and a de facto state within that state but it had 
to deal with the fact that the latter would soon replace the former, and with the fact that 
both could do considerable damage to UN staff, property, and project beneficiaries if 
the United Nations did not play its cards right. 
a 
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UNICEF's Internal Administration and the Two-Zone System in Zaire 
In addition to the interzone communication issues mentioned earlier, the UN agencies 
had to address important policy issues in the divided territory ofZai"re in 1996-1997. 
These policy issues were particularly important for UNICEF as an agency that was 
present in country before, during, and after the refugee crisis and the ensuing civil war. 
In late 1996, UNICEF appointed a temporary "program coordinator" to supervise 
the UNICEF offices in AFDL-held territory. The donor funds arriving for UNICEF 
programs in eastern Za"ire were deposited into the budget ofUNICEF's Rwanda coun-
try office, though the program coordinator reported to the UNICEF regional office in 
Nairobi. This situation was less than satisfactory, and a new solution was devised in 
February-April 1997. 
A new "Chief of Operations"-the author-was appointed in March 1997 to run 
the UNICEF operation behind AFDL lines.24 This operation was called the "Eastern 
Za"ire Operation" (EZO) and it was given its own budget and a full complement of 
established posts. UNICEF decided, however, that the EZO, though autonomous in its 
day-to-day operations, should be linked to the main Za"ire country program run out of 
UNICEF's Kinshasa office. The EZO Chief of Operations reported to the head of the 
Kinshasa office and had to consult him on all strategic issues and on all issues that could 
potentially cross the front line between the AFDL army and the FAZ. The territory 
under the responsibility of the EZO Chief of Operations was to be the territory behind 
the AFDL front line. As various cities with UNICEF sub-offices-Lubumbashi, Mbuji 
Mayi, and Kananga-fell to the AFDL forces, those sub-offices would come under the 
authority of the head of EZO. This management system was modelled loosely on 
UNICEF's modus operandi in another country divided by civil war, namely the Sudan. 
UNICEF's main office in Kinshasa continued to fund those staff posts, administra-
tive costs, and routine program activities-such as immunization-in AFDL territory 
that had existed before the outbreak of the rebellion in the east. Supplies for such activ-
ities were ordered by Kinshasa office from third countries and delivered to EZO terri-
tory via the airports in Entebbe (Uganda) and Kigali (Rwanda) and the pores of 
Mombasa (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). 
Most importantly, it was decided that UNICEF would uphold national-Zalrois-
policies and standards in education, health care, and child protection in all programs 
and projects in AFDL-held territory. Maintaining the integrity of national standards 
was easy since the AFDL was never a secessionist organization, and never placed the 
territorial integrity of the Za"irois/Congolese state in question. In short, everyone 
accepted that Za"ire/DR Congo would one day be reunited under one government, so 
there was never any question of developing separate standards and policies for the east. 
This flexible approach to managing UNICEF operations in a country divided by 
civil war made a lot of sense,25 but it was designed for a long civil war like Sudan's. In 
fact, the AFDrs military victory came much more quickly than anyone expected, after 
only seven-and-a-half months of fighting. UNICEF was then faced with the problem of 
having a unified country with two country programs, one for the east and one for the 
whole country! All new funding received for eastern DR Congo--as the country was 
renamed in May 1997-was placed in the main budget managed by 
UNICEF-Kinshasa from December 1997 onward. UNICEF spent the second half of 
1997 and 1998 using up the funds in the EZO budget and reconciling and winding up 
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back into the main UNICEF country program for DR Congo was implemented from 
January 1998. 
UNICEF's own internal organization under the EZO period was deeply influenced by 
that agency's system of country-based programming. Under this system, a locally based 
office negotiates a program of cooperation with the host government. This system is ide-
ally suited to countries in "normal"-nonemergency-programming situations, and in 
situations where any emergency does not spill over international borders. This system is 
in contrast to that of the UNHCR, whose mandate calls upon it to deal with problems 
that, by definition, have cross-border dimensions, that is refugees. The UNHCR is much 
more likely to organize itself regionally, rather than in a country-based fashion. 
The State-Within-a-State Reemerges: "The Democratic 
Republic of North Kivu" 
Laurent Kabila's honeymoon with the Congolese people, his neighbors, and the interna-
tional community did not last long. Most of the civil service-and even large parts of the 
security apparatus-remained unchanged since Mobutu's time, and, despite some positive 
changes in public sector performance brought in by the new government, the old habits of 
inefficiency, corruption, and brutality soon reemerged.26 For the ordinary Congolese, the 
nouveau regime came quickly to resemble the ancien regime in its day-to-day workings. At 
the policy level, the new AFDL government, once installed in Kinshasa, struggled to 
define a coherent political strategy, economic policy, and attitude toward the donors and 
the international financial institutions, on whose debt Mobutu had already defaulted. 
There were several ideological and other fault lines. The Afro-Marxist and nationalist ten-
dencies in the AFDL government struggled against the more technocratic elements who 
argued the need for international assistance and, hence, some .accommodation with the 
United Nations, the international financial institutions, and the Western donors. 
Divisions within the new government based on ethnic and regional origins were also evi-
dent. Much was made of the differences between the "Katangan faction," including 
President Kabila, "the Kasafan faction" including Economy Minister Pierre-Victor 
Mpoyo, and the "Rwandan" or "Tutsi faction," which included Foreign Minister Bizima 
Karaha, AFDL Secretary-General Deogratias Bugera, and army chief Moise Nyarugabo.27 
Congolese Tutsis, and their Rwandan and Ugandan allies, became prominent 
members of the new army, the Forces Armies Congolaises (FAC). Tutsi elements of the 
FAC and the Rwandan army used their military power to extract economic resources 
from rich and poor Congolese alike, and occasionally from expatriates as well. Such pre-
dations usually went unpunished,28 and were particularly frequent when the army's pay 
day came and went without anyone being paid, a common event in the middle months 
of 1997, as the new government struggled to get a handle on the l.ooted treasury of 
the nation. Stories of the Tutsis' newfound wealth, power, and arrogance began to circu-
late throughout the country. Rightly or wrongly, many Congolese who had months 
before welcomed the Tutsi-led armies of the AFDL and Rwanda as liberators came to 
view the Tutsis as interlopers, thieves, and oppressors. 
Within a few months ofKabila's installation as president, it became obvious that the 
alliance that had brought him to power was crumbling. In particular, frictions arose 
between Kabila and the Tutsi/Rwandan faction, and between Kabila's government and 
his supporters in the governments of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. First of all, Kabila 
no longer needed their military support since the war with Mobutu was over and, given 
128 Lauchla~ T. Munro 
his nationalist leanings, he probably did not want the DR Congo to continue to be 
under their influence. Second, the Tutsi alliance was becoming a political liability for 
Kabila as anti-Tutsi feeling rose and as his government's nationalist tendencies became 
more apparent. Finally, and most importantly, Kabila's new government proved unable 
and-at least in the Tutsis' eyes-unwilling to control the remnants of the Interahamwe 
and the ex-FAR who still roamed the forests and hills of the eastern provinces, harassing 
local Tutsi populations and occasionally crossing the border to attack Rwanda itself. 
Similarly, rebel groups fighting the governments of Burundi and Uganda also were able 
to use Congolese territory as bases from which to attack those countries. The rising level 
of mistrust between Tursis and other ethnic groups was also both the cause and the 
effect of a dual system of administration, which took root in the eastern provinces of 
the DR Congo in the months after the AFDL takeover.29 
Throughout North and South Kivu, Maniema, Province Orientale, and the northern 
parts of Katanga, Tutsis were placed in key positions in Governors' offices, district, and 
zonal offices and in the security forces, especially the FAC, and the Agence Nationale des 
Renseignements (ANR), the secret police. Where a Tutsi was not officially in the top post, 
one was frequently found in the deputy's post. To a lesser extent, the same was true in parts 
of the Kinshasa bureaucracy. In the eastern provinces, where a non-Tutsi was in charge of 
the civil administration, the local military chief w;i; often Tutsi, and relations between the 
military authorities and their nominal civilian masters were testy, or nonexistent. 
Over time, it became evident that this ethnically based arrangement of powers and 
posts amounted to a system of dual control, since the allegiance of most of these Tutsi 
officers lay elsewhere.30 Many of the Tutsis were rumored to be Rwandan, and some 
Ugandan or Burundian. Many whom I met spoke with had Ugandan accents;31 some 
freely confessed to origins in Rwanda, Uganda, or Burundi. It became common both in 
Kinshasa and in the eastern provinces to differentiate between "Congolese" and 
"Rwandans," the latter referring to all Tutsis, regardless of whether they originated in 
DR Congo, Rwanda, or elsewhere. Ethnic tensions mounted dangerously. 
The system of dual control of the state structures, especially in the security forces, 
created high levels of uncertainty for civil servants, the general public, and for the 
UN agencies and NGOs. It was frequently difficult-even impossible-to tell who 
was in charge, since job tides meant little and the real power centers rarely dared 
speak their own names in public. Both sides issued conflicting ii;istructions, or quiet!y-
sometimes, not so quietly-blocked the other side's instructions from being carried out. 
Opportunists inside and outside the state structures sought to profit from the confusion 
for political and/or personal gain. 
In other instances, two or more branches of government claimed authority over the 
same area or activity. In any judicial proceeding, several tribunals and quasi-judicial or 
administrative bodies claimed jurisdiction. Former UN staff who had been dismissed or 
who had not had their contracts renewed appealed for assistance from the Parquet de 
Grande Instance, the Parquet de Petite Instance, the Tribunal, the Ministry of Labor, the 
ANR and the Comitt! Technique. In North Kivu, the ANR, and the Police des Frontieres, 
the former rumored to be allied at the time with the Governor's office and the 
Tutsi/Rwandan faction and the latter reportedly loyal to Kinshasa, argued over who 
should control immigration at Goma airport and at the border crossings with Rwanda 
and Uganda. Each body told the UN agencies and international NGOs in North Kivu 
that it had sole authority for issuing visas to foreign development workers, and each 
issued summonses to those who did not comply with its directives. 
Of par 
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Of particular interest were the AFDG cwo Comites Techniques, established during the 
civil war in North Kivu and Province Orientale to deal wirh AFDL-UN liaison. After the 
AFDL took power in Kinshasa and the normal public services slowly reestablished 
themselves, rhe Comites Techniques continued in both provinces to claim the power to 
coordinate rhe developmental and humanitarian activities of the United Nations and 
the international NGOs, and their relations with the Congolese line ministries. Since rhe 
Congolese state was effectively bankrupt and the United Nations and NGOs were a major 
source of funding for the line ministries, rhe nature and extent of this coordination function 
was of concern to the line ministries, no less than to the United Nation and rhe NGOs. In 
North Kivu, the Comite Technique functioned as part of rhe Governor's office and, hence, 
was closely linked to the Tutsi/Rwandan faction. The North Kivu Comite Technique had 
generally poor relations with the line ministries' offices in Gama; civil servants more or less 
openly challenged the legal basis for the Comite Techniques claims to authority. The Comite 
Technique in turn regularly by-passed the line ministries and issued orders directly to UN 
agencies about what developmental projects and activities should be supported. 
In September 1997, the Comite Technique in North Kivu sponsored an "evaluation" 
of UN agencies and international NGOs operating in that province, with the avowed 
intention of kicking out those who were not performing. The evaluation, which 
used NGO registration forms identical to those used by the Government of Rwanda, 
resulted in the expulsion from North Kivu-but not from other provinces-of a half-
dozen "nonperforming" international NGOs. Reliable sources put it to me that there 
had been intense debates between the Co mite Technique members of the evaluation team 
and some of the representatives of the line ministries. A few months later, the Comite 
Technique in North Kivu tried to regulate the qualifications of expatriate technical assis-
tance workers in the province, thereby usurping functions of the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kinshasa. It was around this time that people 
began talking about "the Democratic Republic of North Kivu," an allusion to the 
province's increasing de facto independence from Kinshasa. 
In Province Orientale, the Comite Technique claimed similar powers and enjoyed 
similarly poor relations with the line ministries, but operated independently of the 
Governor's office. The Comite Technique in Province Orientale did, however, appear to 
work in close collaboration with a senior military officer of "Rwandan" origin. No 
Comite Technique was established in any other province. The Ministry of International 
Co-operation in Kinshasa tried on at least one occasion to exert its authority over the 
Comites Techniques, but without success. 
Conflicts between the two sides in the dual control system usually simmered, but 
occasionally erupted into open violence, even before the outbreak of the new civil war 
and invasion from the east in August 1998. The Kabila government's attempts to rotate 
army units led to mutiny and running gun battles in the streets of Uvira in South Kivu 
and Kalemie in Katanga in December 1997, as Tutsi units refused to obey orders from 
non-Tutsi officers to relocate away from DR Congo's eastern border. The Tutsi troops 
apparently wished to stay close to the DR Congo's border with Burundi and Rwanda, 
both to guard Tutsi-inhabited areas and the borders from incursions and predations by 
the remnants of the lnterahamwe and the ex-FAR. They believed, quite reasonably, that 
other Congolese troops would not be so zealous in defending either the Tutsi communi-
ties in DR Congo or their cousins in Burundi and Rwanda. The Tutsi troops may also 
have feared for their own fate if rhey were rotated at a time of rising ethnic tensions to 
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friendly neighboring states to the east. The Police Nationale fought running battles with 
the Rwandan army and elements of the FAC in Goma almost every night between May 
and September 1997. The Police Nationale and some Tutsi-dominated units of the FAC 
also fought in Kinshasa in early 1998 when a Tutsi officer was arrested by the Police. 
For many months after the AFDL captured Kinshasa with Rwandan support, both 
the Rwandan and Congolese governments denied that such assistance had been pro-
vided. At the same time, however, the Rwandan army operated openly in North Kivu, 
South Kivu, and, to a lesser extent, in Province Orientale. The Burundian army oper-
ated in the southern parts of South Kivu province. The Burundian troops were easy to 
spot because they were the only army in the region to use the Belgian FN rifle; every 
other army used the Russian AK47. I occasionally encountered Ugandan soldiers or 
Ugandan members of the ANR in North Kivu and often heard rumors of the presence 
of Ugandan security forces in the eastern parts of Province Orientale. Members of the 
security forces, the North Kivu Governor's office, and prominent Tutsi residents of 
Goma all crossed to and from Rwanda without having to go through border formalities; 
they were simply waved through the border checkpoint while others waited in line. 
In addition to these facts, the eastern provinces of the DR Congo in general, and 
North Kivu in particular, were full of rumors about the role of Rwanda and the 
Rwandans in the governance of that area in late 1997 and early 1998. All these rumors 
asserted that the Rwandans-and occasionally the Ugandans and the Burundians-
were running the show behind the fai;:ade of a Congolese administration; all these 
rumors asserted that the Rwandans' role was entirely nefarious. Some of these rumors 
turned out to be false. (Rwanda did not invade and annex the Kivus in September 1997, 
though dozens of people assured me that it would.) Some of them turned out to be true. 
(I was warned in May 1998 that "the summer will be hot.") Some others may be true or 
false; I cannot say anything for sure except that they have some plausibility in the light 
of subsequent events. (I was told in March 1998 that all tax revenue in South Kivu went 
to the Rwandese capital of Kigali, not to Kinshasa, and that a Rwandan army unit was 
to be found at the top of the mineshaft of every gold mine in the Kivus. The United 
Nations has documented extensive stripping of Congolese assets by all foreign warring 
parties in DR Congo since the invasion of August 1998 and the ensuing civil war.32) 
Whether these rumors were true or false is possibly of less importance than the fact 
that they circulated widely and were repeated and believed by so many and with such 
vehemence. If nothing else, they were evidence of a shocking growth of the ethnic and 
international tensions that exploded a few months later, and which still fuel the flames 
of war in the DR Congo as I write this essay four years later. These rumors were also 
reflections of what ordinary Congolese in the Kivus intuitively felt about their gover-
nance in 1997-1998, namely that they were living in a state-within-a-state, and that the 
most important parts of the governance and security structures in eastern DR Congo 
were responsive-and responsible-to governments other than the legal government of 
the DR Congo in Kinshasa. 
Needless to say, it was extremely difficult to run humanitarian or development proj-
ects in such an atmosphere. Humanitarian organizations were criticized by the civilian 
authorities for not addressing the crying needs of the Congolese people, while the mili-
tary authorities were preventing those same agencies from going to the field, citing 
"insecurity" outside of the major cities as a reason. Frequently, the military requisitioned 
humanitarian vehicles, communications, and supplies. Appeals from the humanitarian 
agencies to the civilian provincial authorities for help in recovering these items were 
fruitless, as 
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fruitless, as were appeals to the national authorities in Kinshasa. The situation was made 
more complicated by the fact that the politics of the dual control system were different 
in every province and district, and changes in civilian and military personnel-and, 
consequently, changes in alliances and systems of control-were the only constant. To 
give just one example of how complicated things had become, in November 1997, an 
outbreak of polio in Walikale District of North Kivu required immediate action by the 
Regional Health Director's staff and UNICEF. Since Walikale was a militarily sensitive 
area rumored to hold lots of Interahamwe and ex-FAR, the Regional Health Director 
sought the permission of the governor, a Tutsi, and the permission of the local military 
commander, a Katangan. But the area in question was populated largely by Hums and 
was the home area of the Vice governor, who was Hutu. The relief flight of vaccines 
required complicated negotiations over several days before it could take off. In the 
meantime, of course, the outbreak spread, and hundreds of children were affected. 
Conclusions 
Three conclusions emerge about states-within-states; two deal with the UN's relations 
with such entities, and the third is a more general conclusion about the phenomenon of 
states-within-states. The first is that the UN's humanitarian agencies must inevitably 
find themselves working from time to time behind rebel lines; their mandates and 
indeed international humanitarian and human rights law require it. The fact that UN 
agencies are accustomed to-or even designed to-work primarily with de jure national 
governments does not preclude them from working within-and with-states-within-
states. It does mean, however, that UN agencies are at the same time required to deal 
with the de jure authorities as well as the de facto authorities, and that the United 
Nations must often tread carefully between the two, for both practical and diplomatic 
reasons. 
The second is that, when·the United Nations works in and with such states-within-
states, history is important. Even the apparently long distant past of UN involvement in 
a country can have important repercussions on cooperation today. This is especially true 
in the DR Congo, but is also true, for example, in Somalia. 33 The more immediate ori-
gins of large-scale UN involvement in a country may also have important implications 
for how the United Nations is perceived and.handled by local authorities. It is impossi-
ble, for example, to understand the complex relationships between the AFDL-c-before 
and after it became the internationally recognized government of the DR Congo-and 
the United Nations without looking at the UN's huge refugee programs in eastern Zaire 
in the mid-1990s. The circumstances that bring a rebel movement and the United 
Nations into contact with each other will shape much of the future evolution of their 
relationship. 
The third conclusion, and perhaps most important from a theoretical point of view, 
is that what constitutes a state-within-a-state may sometimes be hard to tell. The state-
within-a-state may come in some respects to resemble what other branches of political 
science call the "penetrated state," that is, the situation where a state's independence is 
compromised from within by the agents of another state capturing key parts of the 
administrative apparatus. Even normal categories like "government" and "rebels" or 
"bandits" may be of little use. What happened in the eastern provinces of DR Congo 
after the AFDL took power in Kinshasa is illustrative. At what point did North Kivu 
become a state-within-a-state? My own experience on the ground tells me that North 
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Kivu and, perhaps to a lesser extent, South Kivu were out of the control of Kinshasa 
long before the invasion and outbreak of the new civil war in August 1998. Yet from the 
time the AFDL took Kinshasa in May 1997 to the outbreak of the new war in the east 
15 months later, North and South Kivu looked legally just like any other Congolese 
province. What lay underneath was a much more complex reality, and one that was 
much more difficult for the United Nations to deal with. 
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from much further south, in Katanga; in the 1960s, Kabila's rebel forces allied themselves 
with the Babembe people in their dispute with the Banyamulenge, a branch of the Tutsi in 
South Kivu. Many people were thus surprised to find Kabila in the late 1990s at the head 
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